Costs and benefits of a monetary union. by De Grauwe, Paul
Tijdschrift voor Economie en Management 
Vol. XXXVI, 2, 1991 
Costs and Benefits of a Monetaq Uaaion 
by P. DE GRAUWE'" 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Do we increase our welfare as a nation when we abolish our national 
currency and take over some currency of  a wider area ? Would it be 
good for Belgian, French, Italian, German citizens, when the BF, FF, 
the lira, the mark would disappear and some common European cur- 
rency would take over ? 
Today we tend to answer these questions almost instinctively with 
a resounding yes. Every move towards more union in Europe is a good 
thing. The answer to these questions, however, is not obvious. There 
are benefits  and costs to a monetary union. 
In this inaugural lecture I want to analyze these costs and benefits. 
I will concentrate the attention on the economic costs and benefits, 
exclusively. Surely there is also much to be said about the political 
costs and benefits. And maybe these will turn out to be much more 
important in the decision to move towards a monetary union in Eu- 
rope. My  expertise, however,  about these political  issues is limited. 
I will therefore not deal with the political  aspects of  the problem. 
The question of whether we will gain by relinquishing our national 
currency leads immediately to a new question. Suppose we say, yes, 
it would be good economics to eliminate national currencies, where 
do we stop then ? Should we have one money for the Benelux, or for 
the EC, or for the whole of  Europe, or maybe for the whole world ? 
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start with the costs. I will then move to the benefits. Finally I will at- 
tempt to evaluate these costs and benefits, in the hope to formulate 
some conclusions that are helpful in answering the questions I just 
formulated. 
11. THE COSTS OF A COMMON CURRENCY 
The costs of a monetary union derive from the fact that when a coun- 
try relinquishes its national  currency, it also relinquishes an instru- 
ment of  economic policy. A nation joining a nlonetary union will not 
be able anymore to change the price of its currency (by devaluations 
and revaluations). 
One may raise the issue here of  what good it does for a nation to 
be able to devalue or revalue its currency. There are many situations 
in which the use of  the exchange rate instrument can be very useful 
for an individual nation. This is so because nations are different, in 
some important senses, requiring changes in the exchange rate to oc- 
cur. Let us analyze some of these differences that may require exchan- 
ge rate adjustments. 
A. Shifts  in  Demnrzd 
Consider the case of  a demand shift developed by  Mundell in his ce- 
lebrated article on optimum currency areas1. Let us suppose that for 
some reason EC-consumers shift their preferences away from French- 
made to German-made products. The result of such a shift is that out- 
put declines in France and that it increases in Germany. This is most 
likely to lead to additional unemployment in France and a decline of 
unemployment in Germany. In addition, France is likely to have a cur- 
rent account deficit and Germany a current account surplus as a result 
of  this shift in demand. 
Both countries will have an adjustment problem. France is plagued 
with unemployment and a current account deficit. Germany experien- 
ces a boom which also leads to upward pressures on its price level. 
and it accumulates current account surpluses. The question that arises 
is whether there is a mechanism that leads to automatic equilibration, 
without the countries having to resort to devaluations and revalua- 
tions ? The answer is positive. Theoretically,  there are two mechanisms 
that can automatically bring back equilibrium in  the t~wo  countries. 
One is based on wage and price flexibility, the other on the mobility 
of  labour. 
1. Wage and price flexibility 
If  wages in France and Germany are flexible the following will hap- 
pen.  French workers  who  are unemployed  will  reduce  their wage 
claims. In Germany the excess demand for labour will  push up the 
wage rate. This has the effect of  making the French products more 
competitive again, so that France is able to export more. The opposite 
happens in Germany where the wage push makes German products 
more expensive, and thereby leads to a reduction  in its demand. 
2.  Mobility of  labour 
A second mechanism that will lead to a new equilibrium involves mo- 
bility of  labour. The French unemployed workers move to Germany 
where there is excess demand for labour. This movement of labour 
eliminates the need to let wages decline in  France and increase in 
Germany. Thus, the  Frenchunemployment problem disappears,  where- 
as the inflationary wage pressures in Germany vanish. At the same 
time the current account disequilibria will also decline. The reason 
is that the French unemployed were spending on goods and services 
before without producing anything. This problem tends to disappear 
with the emigration of  the French workers to Germany. 
Thus, in principle the macroeconomic disequilibrium which was the 
result of  the demand shift in France and Germany will disappear au- 
tomatically if  wages and prices are flexible, andlor if  the mobility of 
labour between the two countries is sufficiently high. If  these condi- 
tions are not satisfied, however, the problem will not vanish. Suppose 
for example that wages in France do not decline despite the unem- 
ployment situation, and that French workers do not move to Germa- 
ny. In that case France is stuck in a very uncomfortable situation of 
unemployment and current account deficit, whereas Germany conti- 
nues to accumulate current account surpluses. 
The French authorities will now have a strong incentive to devalue 
the FF. The effect of such an exchange rate adjustment is to improve 
the competitiveness of  French  products  in  Germany,  so that  the 
French can sell more of their products. In Germany, the opposite oc- curs. The revaluation of  the mark reduces German exports and there- 
by reduces thc inflationarj pressures. 
The effects of  this exchange rate change is that France solves its 
unemployment problem, and that Germany avoids having to accept 
inflationary pressures. At the same time, the current account deficit 
of  France and surplus of  Germany tend to disappear. A remarkable 
feat of  using just  one instrument. 
You may certainly feel that this is  too beautiful  to be true. And 
indeed it is. However, for the moment let me just present Mundell's 
theory. I will  come back later with  criticism. 
We can certainly conclude the following : If  France is hit by  a ne- 
gative demand shocli and if  it has relinquished its exchange rate in- 
strument by joining a monetary union with Germany, it will be saddled 
with a sustained unemployment problem, and a current account de- 
ficit if  wages are rigid and if  labour is not mobile. In this sense we 
can say that a monetary union has a cost for France when it is faced 
with a negative demand shock. Similarly, Germany will find it costly 
to be in a monetary union with France, because it will have to accept 
more inflation than it would like. 
Can we solve the problem in which the two countries find them- 
selves by using other instruments than a devaluation ? The answer, 
in principle, is yes. The German authorities could increase taxes in 
Germany so as to reduce aggregate demand. These tax revenues could 
then be transferred to France where they are spent. France would still 
have a current account deficit. However, it would be financed by the 
transfer from Germany. 
It will be obvious that this solution to the problem is  difficult to 
contemplate between sovereign nations, especially since it will have 
to be repeated every year if  the demand shift that started the problem, 
is a permanent one. This solution, however, is frequently applied bet- 
ween regions of the same nation. Many countries have implicit or ex- 
plicit regional redistribution  schemes through the national budget. 
B. Nations can be  Subjected  to other Shocks 
Demand shifts are not the only reasons why nations may contemplate 
the use of the exchange rate instrument to correct for macroeconomic 
disequilibria. Take another example, that recently has become a real 
possibility again : An increase in the price of  oil. Such a shock which 
hits all oil consuming countries in the same way, may nevertheless have  quite  different  consequences for  these  countries.  There  are 
many reasons for this. Labour markets function differently. In one 
countiy the wage indexing scheme leads to an immediate increase in 
wages following the increase in the price of oil, in other countries this 
may not happen. As a resuIt, some countries experience more wage 
and price increases than others which leads to an important loss of 
their competitiveness. These countries may then want to use their ex- 
change rates to correct for this differential development. If  they are 
part of  a monetary union, they will  not be able to do so anymore. 
It may be helpful at this stage to be a little more practical and to 
present a case study of how disturbances affect countries and how the 
exchange rate option can help a nation. 
C.  A Case Study: Belgium and Michigan during the Eigthies 
During the early eighties the industrial world was hit by a severe re- 
cession. This worldwide downturn of economic activity hit regions of 
the world very differently. In general, regions with an older industrial 
structure were hit more severely. We take two examples, Michigan 
in the US, and Belgium in Europe. Both regions have a comparable 
size, and can be said to have a similar  "old" industrial structure. In 
Figures 1 and 2 we present the evolution of  the unen~ployment  rate 
in these two regions and compare them with the total US and Eu- 
ropean unemployment. 
We observe from these figures that unemployment increased sig- 
nificantly more in Michigan and Belgium than in the US and in Eu- 
rope, respectively. It should also be noted that the fact that the US 
is much more integrated economically than Europe did not prevent 
large differentials in unemployment from occuring. In fact the diffe- 
rential development in unemployment rates appear to be even more 
pronounced in the US than in Europe. In the case of  the US, inte- 
gration has also led to a large regional concentration of  the automo- 
bile sector in Michigan. This sector was severely hit by the recession 
of the early eighties. This also explains the intensity of the unemploy- 
ment problem  in Michigan  during that period. 
How did these two regions adjust ? The nature of  the adjustment 
was very different in the two cases. In the case of  Michigan a signi- 
ficant part of  the adjustment was taken care of by outward migration. 
This is shown in Figure 3 (borrowed from Eichengreen (1990)), which 
compares the differential of  the Michigan - US unemployment  rate with the rate of  emigration from Michigan (as a percent of  the Mi- 
chigan population). Note that the percentages are not fully compa- 
rable because the denominators are different. In the case of  the emi- 
gration figures, the denominator is total population, whereas in the 
case of  the unemployment figures the denominator is the active po- 
pulation. The latter is typically less than half of  total population. As 
a result, one percent emigration rate involves more than twice the 
numbers implicit in one percent unemployment  rate. It follows that 
emigration from Michigan was a sizable fraction of  the unemployed, 
and helped to reduce the unemployment  rate of  that state. 
In the case of Belgium the adjustment process was mainly through 
real exchange rate changes. In Figure 4 we show the differential of 
the Belgian-EC unemployment rate together with the real exchange 
rate of the BF. We observe that Belgium adjusted to the unfavorable 
economic developments by a real depreciation of its currency of more 
than 25 percent. This helped to restore competitiveness, and started 
a process of gradual recovery leading to a significant narrowing of the 
unemployment differential between Belgium and the EC. At the end 
of  the eighties this differential  had completely disappeared. About 
half of this real depreciation came about by nominal devaluations, the 
other half by lower cost and price developments in Belgium, compa- 
red to its main trading partners. 
It should also be noted that the real depreciations of the early eigh- 
ties started to have effects on the unemployment rate in Belgium with 
some delay. This contrasts with the Michigan experience where the 
emigration reacted rather quickly to the worsening unemployment si- 
tuation. 
In the case of Michigan very little real depreciation took place. Ac- 
cording to Eichengreen, regional changes in the real exchange rates 
in the US have been limited to a few percentage points during that 
period  (Eichengreen (1990). Note also that these real regional  ex- 
change rates in the US can only change because of  differential  re- 
gional development~  in prices.). In Belgium very little of  the adjust- 
ment took the form of outward migration of Belgian unemployed wor- 
kers. In 1984, for example, the stock of  emigrated Belgian workers 
in the EC (i.e. the sum of  the emigrations from all previous years), 
amounted to barely 40,000. This is 0.4% of  the Belgian population2. 
There is another important difference in the adjustment mecha- 
nism in these two regions. This has to do with fiscal policies. In the 
case of  Michigan the Federal budget tended to automatically transfer purchasing power to Michigan. This result came about mainly through 
the Federal transfers for the unemployed, and through the reduction 
in Federal tax revenues from Michigan. It has been estimated by Sachs 
and Sala-i-Martin(l989) that for every decline in state income of $1 
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the Federal budget transfers back 40 cents to the state. 
Belgium could not profit from such an intra-European redistribu- 
tion. Instead, Belgium let its government budget deficit increase spec- 
tacularly and borrowed heavily in the foreign capital markets. This 
allowed it to soften the blow of the recession. It also implied that the 
interregional solidarity which was present in the US, was substituted 
by  an intergenerational solidarity within Belgium, where future ge- 
nerations of  Belgians will  have to service the government debt. FIGURE 2 
Unernploytnent Rate, Michigan and  US, 1971-85 
+  Michigan +  US 
Source :  Eichengreen (1990). 
From this analysis one could be tempted to conclude that a mo- 
netary union for a country like Belgium is going to be very costly and 
therefore unattractive. This would, however, be too rash a conclusion. 
We have not yet introduced the benefits of  a monetary union. After 
all one can only draw conclusion after comparing costs with benefits. 
In addition, there is some criticism to be levied against the preceding 
analysis. To this criticism I now turn my  attention. 
D. The Discipline Argument 
Quite often the divergent movements one observes in the competi- 
tiveness of  nations, is the result of  ill-conceived policies, and not of 
some exogenous disturbance that hits nations. Take the example of 
Belgium again. Some will argue that the wage and price explosion that 
occurred in Belgium during the second half of the seventies, was made FIGURE 3 
Miclligan  Unemployment Differential and  Emigration,  1971-84 
+  Unemployment Mich - US  +  Emigration as % of population 
So~rrce  :  Eichengreen (1990). 
possible by  a lack of  discipline of  the Belgian authorities, mainly the 
budgetary authorities, and the Belgian trade unions. The fact that a 
devaluation could be used gave an incentive to both the government 
and the unions to behave in an undisciplined manner. In a monetary 
union, authorities and unions, knowing that the exchange rate is ir- 
revocably fixed, will show more restraint. The government is aware 
that the exchange rate cannot be changed anymore, so that there will 
be more monetary and budgetary discipline. Similarly unions know 
that excessive wage increases cannot later be corrected anymore by 
a devaluation. Thus, they will refrain from excessive wage claims be- 
cause in a monetary union the loss of  competitiveness and therefore 
of  employment cannot easily be corrected. This leads to the sugges- 
tion that had Belgium been part of a monetary union in the seventies, 
the wage and price explosion would not have occurred. FIGURE  4 
Uizelnploynzent rate and real exchange rate, Belgium,  1971  -90 
+  Unenlployment  +  Real Exchange Rate 
Source :  EC-Commission, European Economy. 
This argument now has become very popular, especially in the La- 
tin countries where the distrust against the national authorities runs 
very deep. In these countries a monetary union is seen as a disciplining 
device. It takes away the devaluation option, and therefore prevents 
the authorities from doing foolish things. A monetary union ties the 
hands of  the national  authorities so to speak. Many people in this 
country (Belgium) have the same Latin distrust and hail a monetary 
union as a device to discipline our national government which would 
do foolish things were it not for the existence of  these external con- 
straints. 
There is certainly an important grain of  truth in this argument. It 
says that if  people face sufficiently high sanctions, they will behave 
in a disciplined way.  Conversely, in a permissive society people will 
commit many crimes. The devaluation option creates this permissive 
environment which weak governments surely will  abuse. This argument, however, should not be stretched too far. There are 
several reasons  for this. First, not all unfavorable  developments in 
competitiveness are the result of  policy mistakes due to a lack of  mo- 
netary discipline. Take the case of Belgium again. Surely, a monetary 
union may have imposed more discipline in the system. However, it 
should not be forgotten that during the seventies, the Belgian Natio- 
nal Bank tied the currency very closely to the mark, and did impose 
a lot of monetary discipline. This did not prevent wages from increa- 
sing too fast. To some degree this was due to the wage indexing me- 
chanism which, more than in other countries, led to a wage price spiral 
following the two oil shocks of  1973-74 and 1979. This problem could 
certainly arise again, even if  Belgium would become part of  a mone- 
tary union. Thus, such institutional features as automatic wage index- 
ing will have to go if we want to avoid problems in a future monetary 
union. 
Second, the case of  Michigan also illustrates that regions that are 
part of  a monetary union and therefore are subject to monetary dis- 
cipline, can nevertheless experience large deteriorations in their com- 
petitive  position.  In the case of  Michigan  this  deterioration  came 
about because of an unfavorable industrial structure. Also in the case 
of  Belgium during the seventies and the early eighties, the intensity 
of  the economic downturn was the result of  old and unadapted in- 
dustrial structures which had the effect that the world-wide recession 
hit the Belgian economy particularly severely. 
Thirdly, while it is true that taking away the control over national 
moneys from the national authorities imposes a lot of  discipline on 
these governments, we will have to give the authority over money to 
other, European, decision makers. What guarantee is there that these 
European policy-makers will behave in a more disciplined way than 
their national counterparts ? There is no reason to think that this will 
automatically be the case. We should shed this naive European op- 
timism that believes that European policy-makers are inherently wiser 
than national authorities. 
Let me conclude this part by stating that in a monetary union there 
will continue to be circumstances in which a devaluation or a reva- 
luation would be a handy instrument to correct for macroeconomic 
disequilibria. Relinquishing one's money therefore does impose a cost 
on nations. 111. THE BENEFITS OF A COMMON CURRENCY 
Whereas the costs of  a common currency have much to do with the 
macroeconomic management of the economy, the benefits are mostly 
situated at the microeconomic level. Eliminating national currencies 
and moving to a common currency can be expected to lead to gains 
in economic efficiency. These gains in  efficiency have two different 
origins. One is the elimination of transaction costs associated with the . 
exchanging of  national moneys. The other is the elimination of  risk 
coming from the uncertain future movements of  the exchange rates. 
A. Direct  Gains fi-orn  the Elimination  of Transaction Costs 
Eliminating the costs of exchanging one currency into the other is cer- 
tainly the most visible (and most easily quantifiable) gain from a mo- 
netary union. We have all experienced these costs whenever we ex- 
changed one currency into another. These costs disappear when coun- 
tries move to a common  European currency. 
How large  are these  gains  from  the elimination  of  transaction 
costs ? The EC-Commission has recently estimated these gains, and 
arrives at a number between 13 to 20 billion ECU per year3. This re- 
presents one fourth to one half percent of the Community GDP. This 
may seem peanuts. It is, however, a gain that has to be added to the 
other gains from a single market. 
It should be noted here that these gains that accrue to the general 
public have a counterpart somewhere. They are mostly to be found 
in  the banking  sector.  Surveys in  different  countries  indicate that 
about 5% of  the banks' revenues are the commissions paid to banks 
in the exchange of national currencies. This source of revenue for the 
banks will disappear with  a monetary union. 
The preceding should not give the impression that the gain for the 
public is offset by the loss of the banks. The transaction costs involved 
in exchanging money are a deadweight loss. They are like a tax paid 
by the consumer in exchange for which he gets nothing. Banks, how- 
ever, will have a problem of transition : they will have to look for other 
profitable activities. When this has been done, society will have gai- 
ned. The employees of  the banks, previously engaged in exchanging 
money, will now be free to perform more useful  tasks for society. B. Exchange Rate  Urzcertairzfy and the Price Mechanism 
The second source of  benefit of  a monetary union comes from the 
reduction of exchange risk. Exchange rate uncertainty introduces un- 
certainty about the future prices  of  goods  and services. Economic 
agents base their  decisions  concerning production, investment and 
consumption on the information that the price system provides them. 
If  these prices become more uncertain the quality of  these decisions 
will  decline. 
We can make these general statements more concrete by consider- 
ing an example. Suppose, a firm decides to invest in a foreign country. 
It bases this decision on many variables. One of  these is the expected 
future exchange rate. Suppose then that after having made the invest- 
ment, it turns out that the exchange rate on which the decision was 
made, was wrong and that this forecast error makes the whole invest- 
ment unprofitable so that the firm decides to close its foreign ope- 
ration. Such errors will be costly. One can also expect them to be more 
frequent when the uncertainty about the future exchange rate increa- 
ses. In this sense, the price system, which gives signals to individuals 
to produce or to invest, becomes less reliable as a mechanism to al- 
locate resources. Conversely, when the price uncertainty declines be- 
cause of the introduction of a common currency, the price system will 
be a better guide in making the right  decisions. Although these ef- 
ficiency gains are difficult to quantify, they are certainly quite impor- 
tant. 
C. Exchange Rate Uncertaing and Economic  Growth 
The argument that the elimination of  the exchange risk will lead to 
an increase in economic growth is often made. It features prominently 
in the recent EC-report "One Market, One Money". The basic ar- 
gument is as follows. Less exchange risk will reduce overall risk. It 
will therefore lead to lower real interest rates. This will in turn sti- 
mulate investment, and through this channel it will boost economic 
growth. 
This analysis sounds plausible. Thkre is however very little empi- 
rical evidence to back it up. We present some evidence in Table 1, 
which of  course is not conclusive, but which suggests that the relation 
is rather weak. We show the growth rates of  GDP and of investment 
in industrial countries during the eighties. We classify these countries into two  groups, those  that have  experienced  relatively  stable  ex- 
change rates (mainly the EMS countries) and those that have seen 
their exchange rates fluctuate a lot. In general, the latter countries 
have experienced exchange variability that is three to five times as lar- 
ge as the former. 
The numbers of  Table 1 are striking. The greater exchange rate 
stability that the EMS-countries have experienced during the eighties 
does not seem to have provided a great boost to the growth rates of 
output and investment4.  As a matter of fact, the growth rates of output 
and investment have on average been lower in the EMS-countries 
than in the non-EMS countries in the rest of the industrialized world 
that experienced relatively large movements in their exchange rates. 
TABLE 1 
Growth of  GDP and of Investment  (1981-90) 
















Another way to show this lack of a robust relationship between eco- 
nomic growth and exchange rate risk is to look at the growth rate of 
countries as a function of their size. Large countries have a large mo- 
netary zone within which there is no exchange rate uncertainty. Firms 
in small countries typically face much more exchange rate uncertainty 
because they sell a larger proportion of their final output to countries 
GDP  Investment 
1.9  2.0 
1.9  1.3 
2.1  1.7 
2.8  0.3 
2.1  1.8 
2.5  2.0 
1.8  2.6 
2.7  4.2 
2.7  5.3 
1.6  0.0 
2.4  3.8 
3.0  3.6 
4.1  5.9 in different monetary areas. Thus, a large part of these sales face ex- 
change rate uncertainty. Therefore one would expect that, if  there is 
a link between exchange rate uncertainty and economic growth, larger 
countries will on average experience a higher growth rate of  output 
than small countries. We show some evidence in Figure 5. On the ver- 
tical axis we present the growth rates during 1965-S7, on the horizon- 
tal axis the size of these countries as measured by their GDP (in 1987). 
It is immediately clear that there is no relationship between the size 
of  countries and their growth rates. 
We conclude that the existing evidence that a lower exchange rate 
uncertainty stimulates growth is very weak. We should not expect too 
much additional economic growth from a monetary union in Europe. 
There are two possible  explanations for our failure to find a sig- 
nificant empirical relationship between exchange rate uncertainty and 
economic growth. 
A first explanation is that when we compare the experience of the 
EMS-countries with the other countries, we failed to take into account 
the fact that the exchange rate uncertainty within the EMS, although 
reduced, has not been eliminated. It may be that the movement to 
full monetary union with a common currency is the step we need to 
eliminate the exchange rate uncertainty, and to stimulate economic 
growth. (Note however that this interpretation of the empirical results 
is less convincing when we look at the evidence concerning the size 
of  countries). 
A second more promising explanation is that the reduction in ex- 
change rate uncertainty may not necessarily reduce the systemic risk. 
Less exchange rate uncertainty may be compensated by  greater un- 
certainty elsewhere, e.g. interest rate uncertainty. As a result, firms 
that face a greater monetary zone may not on average operate in a 
less risky  environment5. 
D. Conclusion 
A monetary union has important benefits. First, a common currency 
in Europe will eliminate transaction costs. Second, by reducing price 
uncertainty, a common currency will improve the allocative efficiency 
of the price mechanism. This will certainly improve welfare, although 
it is difficult to quantify this effect. 
We have also concluded that we should not expect too much ad- 
ditional  economic  growth  from  a  monetary  union.  The potential FIGURE  5 
Growtlz rates of  GDP (1965-87) and level of  GDP (1987) 
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Source: OECD, Economic Outlook. 
growth-boosting effects of a monetary union have been oversold. The 
theoretical  reasons  for  a  monetary  union  to  stimulate  economic 
growth are weak, and so is the empirical evidence. The benefits of 
a monetary union are to be found elsewhere than in its alleged growth- 
stimulating effects. 
IV. COSTS AND BENEFITS COMPARED 
From our previous analysis it will also be clear that costs and benefits 
of relinquishing one's national money are related to the size and the 
degree of  openness of a country. In general we can formulate the fol- 
lowing two rules : 
- the more open a country is, the larger the gains it has from joining 
a monetary union ; 
- the more open a country is, the smaller the costs are from loosing 
control over its national money (and exchange rate). We can represent these two rules in the following graph (Figure 
6). The intersection point of the benefit and the cost lines determines 
the critical level of  openness that makes it worthwile for a country 
to join  a monetary union with its trading partners. To the left of that 
point, the country is better off keeping its national currency. To the 
right it is better off when it relinquishes its national money and takes 
over the money of  its trading partners. 
Figure 6 allows us to draw some qualitative conclusions concerning 
the importance of  costs and benefits. The shape and the position of 
the cost schedule depends to a large extent on one's view about the 
effectiveness of the exchange rate instrument in correcting for the ef- 
fects of  different demand and cost developments between the coun- 
tries involved. 
At one extreme, there is a view, which will be called monetarist, 
claiming that exchange rate changes are ineffective as instruments to 
correct for these different developments between countries. And even 
if  they are effective, the use of exchange rate policies typically makes 
countries worse off. In this monetarist viewqhe cost curve is very close 
to the origin. We represent this case in Figure 7a. In this monetarist 
view of  the world, the critical point that makes it worthwile to form 
a union is close to the origin. Thus, in this view, many countries in 
the world would gain by relinquishing their national currencies, and 
by joining  a monetary union. 
At the other extreme, there is the Keynesian view that the world 
is full of  rigidities  (wages and prices are rigid, labour is immobile), 
so that the exchange rate is a powerful instrument to eliminate dis- 
equilibria. In this view, the cost curve is far away from the origin, so 
that relatively few countries should find it in their interest to join  a 
monetary union. It also follows from this view that many large coun- 
tries that now have one currency would be better off  (economically) 
splitting the country in different monetaly zones. 
It is unmistakable that since the early eighties the monetarist view 
has gained  adherents, and has changed  the view  many  economists 
have about the desirability of a monetary union. Today the consensus 
seems to have evolved favoring monetary unification, certainly in Eu- 
rope. 
What does this analysis teach us about the issue of  whether EC- 
countries would benefit from a monetary union ? In order to answer 
this question we present some data on the importance of the intra-EC 
trade for each EC-country. The data are in Table 2. FIGURE  6 
Costs arzd  benefits of n rnor~etilly  unlorl 
Costs and benefits 
%  of GDP 
%  of GDP 
FIGURE  7 
Costs and  benefits of  n moneta~y  union 
Trade  Share  Trade Share TABLE 2 
Intra-Coi~zn~uni  esports of EC-countries  (0s % of  their. GDPj irz  1990 
Ireland  50.1 
Belgium  49.8 
Netherlands  40.0 
Portugal  19.6 
Germany  16.1 
Denmark  13.9 
France  12.5 
Greece  11.6 
United Kingdom  9.5 
Italy  9.4 
Spain  7.1 
Source: EC-Commission, European Economy. 
The most striking feature of Table 2 is the large difference in open- 
ness of  EC-countries with the rest of  the Community. This suggests 
that the cost-benefit calculus is likely to be very different for the EC- 
countries. For some countries with a large degree of openness relative 
to the other EC-partners, the cost-benefit calculus is likely to tilt to- 
wards joining  a European monetary union. This will most likely be 
the case of  the Benelux-countries and Ireland. Other countries, e.g. 
the UK, Italy and Spain have a relatively low openness towards the 
rest of the EC (in 1990). The case for joining a monetary union with 
the rest of  Europe does not  appear to be overwhelming for  these 
countries. 
Of  course, if  one is  sufficiently monetarist, one could argue that 
for countries with such low degrees of  openness, the benefits would 
still outweigh the costs, and joining a monetary union would also for 
these countries make sense from an economic point of  view. 
The analysis implicit in  Figure  6 and the empirical  evidence  of 
Table 2 suggest that a two-speed Europe in the monetary integration 
proces  could make sense. For some countries it would be sensible 
from an economic point of  view to tie their monetary fate to others. 
The most obvious case would be the Benelux with Germany. Other 
EC-countries, however, may find it advantageous to wait and see, until 
the "time is ripe", i.e. until the cost-benefit calculus tilts more in favor 
of  the benefits. V. CONCLUSION 
-. 
l he arguments deveioped in this iecture iead me to formuiate two 
conclusions. First, it is unlikely that the EC as a whole constitutes an 
optimal currency area. Put differently, not all EC-countries have the 
same interest in relinquishing their national currencies and in  adhe- 
ring to a European monetary union. The cost-benefit analysis there- 
fore also implies that a monetary unification in Europe will better suit 
the economic interests of  the different individual countries if  it can 
proceed with different speeds, i.e. if  some countries who today feel 
that it is not in their national interest to do so, have the option to 
wait before joining  the union. 
Second, even the countries that most likely would be net gainers 
from a monetary union, have to take into account that, faced with dis- 
turbances like the one that occurred during the early eighties, they 
will pay a price for relinquishing their national currencies. Belgium, 
for example, would, H believe, gain from joining a monetary union. We 
should be aware, however, that there will also be costs involved. The 
weakness of  the Belgian industrial structure, the special features of 
its labour markets (including the wage indexing  system), the weak 
budgetary situation may, as in the recent past, lead to divergent trends 
in competitiveness which will be more difficult to correct when we are 
part of  a European monetary union. 
The analysis I have done here has been based on an economic cost- 
benefit analysis. Countries may also decide to adopt a common cur- 
rency for polztical  reasons. A common currency may be the first step 
towards a political  union, that they wish to achieve. The economic 
cost-benefit analysis remains usef~~l,  however, because it gives an idea 
of the price some countries will have to pay to achieve these political 
objectives. 
NOTES 
1.  See Mundell  (1961). 
2. See T. Straubhaar, International Labour Migration within a Common Market: Some 
Aspects of  the EC Experience, Journal of  Common Market Studies, 1988. 
3.  See EC-Commission, One Market, One Money, 1990 
4. For more evidence on the growth  effects of  the EMS, see De Grauwe (1987). 
5.  There is a whole theoretical litel-ature,  starting with Willia~n  Poole (1970), that has ana- 
lyzed  this problem. 
6.  This is the view taken by  the drafters of the recent EC-report "One Market, One Mo- 
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